The most advanced fighter jet in NATO history is now at the center of a trust crisis with one of NATO’s own.
Story Snapshot
- Turkey was kicked out of the F-35 program after buying Russia’s S-400 missile system.
- U.S. law now flatly blocks any F-35 transfers to Turkey while it still owns S-400s.
- Turkey kept key F-35 production tools, raising long-term security and reverse-engineering fears.
- Congress, Israel, and many defense experts see readmitting Turkey as a major risk, not a misunderstanding.
How Turkey Went From Core Partner To Security Problem
Turkey did not join the F-35 program as a bit player. It was invited in early as a major partner, with plans to buy over 100 jets and build hundreds of key parts for the fleet. It invested more than a billion dollars and integrated its factories into the global supply chain. That all changed in 2019, when Ankara accepted delivery of Russia’s S-400 air defense system. The White House then announced Turkey’s removal, saying the F-35 “cannot coexist” with a Russian intelligence platform aimed at its secrets.
Trump, seated next to Erdogan in Ankara, asked directly about Turkey's Russian S-400 missile defense system, the exact legal obstacle blocking F-35 readmission since 2019: "I don't have concerns about anything."
That's the entire six-year dispute, the intelligence fears about…
— The Tectonic (@thetect0nic) July 7, 2026
Defense officials did not treat this as a minor dispute. The Pentagon began “unwinding” Turkey from the program, ordering Turkish pilots and engineers to leave U.S. bases and planning to retool the supply chain at a cost of hundreds of millions of dollars. Congress had already moved once to block F-35 transfers over the S-400 issue, reflecting deep concern that the jet’s stealth profile could be mapped by Russian technicians operating Turkish S-400 batteries. This was about protecting an entire generation of American airpower, not punishing a temperamental ally.
Why The S-400 Crossed A Bright Red Line
The F-35’s edge comes from how hard it is to track, target, and kill. Russia’s S-400 system is built to do exactly that. Experts warned that running F-35s near S-400 radars would give Russian advisers a rare, real-world chance to study the jet’s signature and find weaknesses. The White House echoed this worry directly, calling the S-400 a “Russian intelligence collection platform” that would be used to learn about the F-35’s advanced capabilities. From a common-sense conservative view, you do not hand your best weapon to someone who just installed your enemy’s best sensor in their backyard.
Congress then put this fear into law. Section 1245 of the 2020 defense bill says no F-35s can go to Turkey unless it no longer possesses the S-400 and promises never to buy similar Russian systems again. Analysts note Turkey has not met a single one of these conditions. Ankara has not destroyed the system, shipped it out, or turned it over for allied testing. So when some politicians float readmission as if it were a routine favor to an old friend, they brush past hard legal and strategic limits that were built for a reason.
Lingering Tools And Long-Term Technology Risk
Even after expulsion, Turkey did not hand back every piece of F-35 hardware. Reports based on defense archives say Turkish Aerospace Industries still retains sensitive F-35 production equipment five years after removal from the program. There is no public proof that Turkey has reverse-engineered the jet. But keeping advanced tooling for key components in a country now sanctioned for Russian arms ties is a serious exposure. American conservative values stress prudence with national secrets. Hoping nothing bad happens is not a security policy.
Trump, in Ankara: "We don't want to sanction friends." He says he will remove the CAATSA sanctions on Turkey.
CAATSA, the sanctions regime imposed in 2020 alongside Turkey's F-35 expulsion, is the actual legal mechanism blocking both the F-35 readmission and the broader defense…
— The Tectonic (@thetect0nic) July 7, 2026
Think about the stakes. The F-35 is the planned backbone of next-generation NATO air operations, connecting sensors, weapons, and data across the alliance. If its stealth profile is compromised, every nation flying it loses value, and adversaries gain leverage for decades. Letting any partner sit on sensitive tooling while cozying up to Moscow breaks the basic trust needed for shared technology. That is why many experts argue the United States must verify what happens inside Turkish factories, not take polite assurances at face value.
Politics, Allies, And The Push To Bend The Rules
Turkey’s government calls the expulsion unfair and leans on its status as a longtime NATO member. Some reports suggest Ankara has looked for ways to offload or return the S-400s, trying to thread the legal needle for reentry. Yet talk is cheap until Turkey actually no longer owns the system and proves it with hard evidence. A bipartisan group of U.S. lawmakers has already urged the State Department to reject Turkey’s request to rejoin the program, warning that doing so without removing the S-400 would expose American military secrets to Russian intelligence.
Other allies add weight to the caution. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has warned that selling F-35s to Turkey would upset the regional balance of power, pointing to Turkish President Erdogan’s hostile rhetoric toward Israel. That resonates with readers who value a strong U.S.–Israel partnership and clear lines against regimes that flirt with anti-Western and anti-Israel positions. When you combine congressional law, technical risk, and allied concern, the case against trusting Turkey with the F-35 looks solid, not emotional.
Can Trust Be Rebuilt, Or Is The Damage Permanent?
Some in Washington argue that if Turkey truly gets rid of the S-400 and proves it, the narrow legal test for reentry could be met. That view treats the issue as a fixable transaction. The tougher view says damage is already done. Turkey bought advanced Russian weapons despite clear warnings, kept them despite sanctions, and still holds F-35-related tooling despite being cut out. From a common-sense conservative stance, that pattern shows poor judgment and shaky alignment with U.S. interests.
The deeper question is not whether Turkey can someday meet a checklist. It is whether a partner that crossed such a clear red line should ever again sit inside the most sensitive circle of American military technology. Right now, with laws on the books, equipment still in Turkish hands, and the S-400 still on Turkish soil, the answer is simple: Turkey cannot be trusted with the F-35.
Sources:
19fortyfive.com, defensenews.com, bbc.com, turkishminute.com, aei.org, fddaction.org, youtube.com, thehill.com, pappas.house.gov, reddit.com, jstor.org, npr.org, en.wikipedia.org
